Alchian and Allen visit the IRS: costly audits and taxpayer compliance by McKee, Mike & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
Archived version from NCDOCKS Institutional Repository http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/ 
 
Blackwell, C., & McKee, M. (2012). Alchian and Allen visit the IRS: costly audits and taxpayer compliance. 
Applied Economics Letters, 19(17), 1731-1734. doi:10.1080/13504851.2012.667541 
 
 
Alchian and Allen visit the IRS: costly audits and 
taxpayer compliance 
 
 
Calvin Blackwell and Michael McKee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This article reports on the results from a small-scale investigation of the compliance 
effects of a costly pre-audit on tax compliance. The tax compliance game is modelled in 
three parts: a declaration phase, a pre-selection phase with a cost for taxpayers and an 
audit selection phase where all evaded income is discovered. While the theoretical 
predictions are ambiguous, the data from a series of laboratory experiments 
demonstrate that the presence of pre-audit costs leads to lower tax compliance. 
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I. Introduction 
The individual compliance costs of the US personal income tax system are well 
documented. Slemrod and Bakija (1996) estimated compliance costs of the entire 
federal tax system to be $75 billion, which yields an average cost of $650 per person. 
Many argue that these costs contribute to the general dissatisfaction with the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). An interesting research question is the effect of these costs on 
taxpayer behaviour. What is less well investigated is the effect on taxpayer behavior 
when there is a cost associated with being audited that is independent of whether the 
taxpayer has evaded. 
 
Alchian and Allen (1966) argued for the ‘shipping the good apples out’ phenomenon. In 
the presence of a cost (transportation) that is independent of quality, the shipper will find 
that the high-quality item will better absorb the ‘fixed’ (quality-independent) shipping 
charges. A costly audit may serve the same function – a taxpayer facing a certain cost 
of being audited may reason that some evasion is justified. In the absence of the 
penalty for noncompliance, an audit will cost the taxpayer the same whether income is 
fully disclosed or not. 
 
Data from a series of laboratory experiments are used to investigate this question. 
Audited taxpayers must pay taxes and penalties on undeclared income, but in addition, 
taxpayers must prepare for (and endure) an audit. This process may involve finding 
records of deductions, expenses and income. This cost is nontrivial and will be incurred 
even if the subsequent audit reveals that the taxpayer was in compliance. That is, a 
substantial portion of the cost of the audit is a fixed cost. Even if the taxpayer feels 
confident that his/her tax return was correct, the tax code is sufficiently complex that 
there will be significant uncertainty as to whether the return was completed correctly. 
 
II. Theory 
The tax reporting process we use in this article has three stages. In stage 1, the 
taxpayer selects how much income to declare. In stage 2, the tax agency decides which 
taxpayers are likely candidates. We model this process as stochastic, although it is easy 
to imagine this may not be the case, owing to auditors’ past experiences, tips about 
evaders and so on. If a taxpayer is selected in stage 2 (we call this selected for a pre-
audit), that individual may be selected for an audit. In any case, the individual is 
required to present his/her information to the tax agency and incurs a fixed cost for 
providing this material. In stage 3, the tax agency chooses where to deploy fully its 
auditing resources among the individuals selected for a pre-audit. The selection for a 
full-blown audit may be made based on the expected level of under-reporting, or it may 
be made randomly. 
 
Taking the model introduced in Allingham and Sandmo (1972) as the base, we define 
the following variables: 
 
 
 
A taxpayer faces three possible outcomes: 
 
WN, which is the wealth if not audited for taxpayer: 
 
 
 
WS, which is the wealth if pre-audited but not audited: 
 
 
 
WA, which is the wealth if audited: 
 
 
 
We assume the taxpayer’s attempts to maximize his/her expected utility of wealth, 
where utility is the familiar von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function U = U(W), with U0 
. 0, U00 , 0. We further assume _ . t (the penalty for evading taxes is greater than the 
initial tax obligation) and that pS. pA. The individual wishes to maximize the expected 
utility with respect to declared income, x: 
 
 
 
The first-order condition for this maximization is 
 
 
 
To find the effect of a change in the cost of selection, we differentiate the first-order 
condition with respect to c: 
 
 
 
Note that this derivative may be either positive or negative, depending on the level of 
absolute risk aversion. 
 
III. Experimental Design 
To test the behavioural response to costly audits, we conduct a series of laboratory 
experiments. The experiment setting is a modification of the design used by Alm et al. 
(1992). In each round the subject receives an income, in tokens,2 which is determined 
by a random draw from a uniform distribution between 2 and 4, in increments of 0.2 
tokens and is known only by the subject. Once the subjects know their income, they are 
asked to declare anywhere from 0 to their entire income. After all subjects have 
declared their income, the experimenters randomly selected up to five subjects for a 
pre-check. All subjects selected for a pre-check incurred a cost of either 0.1 tokens 
(treatment 1) or 0.2 tokens (treatment 2). In the baseline setting the cost is set at 0. Of 
the five subjects selected for a pre-check, one subject may have been selected for an 
audit (a ‘check’ according to the instructions). 
 
The selection process for pre-checks and checks worked as follows. All subjects are 
assigned a number. Each subject has a bingo ball with their subject number placed in a 
cage, along with a number of blank bingo balls. The number of blank balls was 
determined in order to make the total number of balls in the cage 25. Five balls were 
picked from the bingo cage without replacement. These corresponding subjects are 
those selected for a ‘pre-check’. Of those five balls, the first ball was set to have been 
selected for both the pre-check and the check. All five balls are drawn prior to the 
numbers being announced. Technically our process does not exactly conform to the 
model; instead of sequential selections, the subjects face only one. Our design avoids 
the problem of compound lotteries. By collapsing the two stages we eliminate the 
compound lottery. Given the structure of the balls in the bingo cage, the probability of 
being selected for a pre-check for each subject was 0.2, while the probability of being 
selected for an audit was 0.04. We selected these parameters to allow us to compare 
our results with previous research in this area, as well as to accord with typical random 
selection employed by the IRS. 
 
The experiment continues for 25 rounds (although this is not announced to the 
subjects). Each round the subjects receive income, declare income, pay taxes and face 
the audit process described above. The subjects learn the audit results and have their 
balances updated each round. When the session is completed, the subjects are paid 
their accumulated earnings in private. 
 
In all sessions, the person running the experiment read the instructions aloud to the 
subjects while they followed along on their own copies. The instructions were written to 
be as context neutral as possible; terms such as ‘audit’ and ‘tax’ were replaced with 
neutral terms such as ‘check’ and ‘rate’, respectively. Next, the subjects were given the 
opportunity to ask questions. After the experimenters answered all questions, the 
subjects played three practice rounds. Again, the subjects could ask questions. After all 
questions were answered, the main experiment began. Earnings averaged 
approximately $15.00 for a session lasting less than 45 minutes on average. 
 
 
 
IV. Experimental Results 
Based on the fixed cost argument as proposed by Alchian and Allen, we predict that 
compliance will be lower when audits are themselves costly. Individuals facing the fixed 
cost of an audit will find the relative costs of evasion have fallen and will thus comply 
less. 
 
Summary statistics by treatment are shown in Table 1, while the round-by-round 
compliance rates are shown in Fig. 1. Contrary to our expectations, we find that with 
high audit costs (cost=0.2) compliance rates are very high initially. However, the 
compliance rates decline over time and end up below 20%. With low audit costs (cost = 
0.1) the compliance rates also decline over time. When there is zero cost associated 
with the audit event (fines are imposed only for evasion), the compliance rate is very 
steady throughout the session. This latter result is consistent with the prior results of 
Alm et al. (1992). 
 
Table 1. Average compliance rates by treatment 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Average compliance rates by round and treatment 
 
To check the impression given by the summary statistics and the graphical analysis, we 
estimated by Generalized Least Squares (GLS) a simple random effects regression: 
 
 
 
where Compi,t is the compliance rate for participant I in round t; Inci,t is the participant’s 
income in that round; BegBali,t is the participant’s cumulative earnings by round i; 
Hi_Costi,t and Lo_Costi,t are dummy variables indicating the high-cost and low-cost 
treatments; ui is the subject-specific dummy variable; and ei,t is a standard normal error 
term. The regression results are presented in Table 2. These results confirm the 
conclusions drawn from the summary statistics and graphical analysis. Our results 
support our conjecture, based on the Alchian and Allen argument, that high costs of 
being audited will lead to lower compliance rates rather than higher. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Regression results 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
Our results suggest that the IRS would do well to reduce the fixed costs (absent 
penalties for evasion) of audits to individual taxpayers. It would appear that the Alchian 
and Allen argument applies to tax compliance as it does to shipping only high-quality 
local produce from the region in which it is produced. Our results should be considered 
as suggestive given the small range of costs investigated. However, a consistent 
pattern of behaviour does appear and this warrants further investigation since the policy 
implications appear to be considerable. 
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